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Abstract 
 
Why do organizations persist in adhering to past patterns of practice in the face of 
information that should have caused them to change? The learning literature explains 
such limited productive organizational learning as an outcome of unintended 
organizational processes due to cognitive limitations. However, in this paper we find 
confirmation for the argument that there might also be intended processes behind 
these learning outcomes. 
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THE SUCCESS TRAP IN ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: COGNITIVE AND 
POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS 
 
     Introduction  
Organizational adaptation to changing environments is described as a functional             
requirement for organizational survival and as a critical requirement of management 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Fligstein, 1990; Schein, 1992; Senge, 1993). Therefore, 
successful organizations are seen as having capabilities for adaptation, and good 
leaders are widely praised for their strategic use of knowledge, and for their 
cleverness and will to change organizations by transforming vision into reality.  
 
Adaptation can be an outcome of several different processes. One of these is learning 
from experience (Levitt and March, 1988; Huber, 1996). Such learning has many 
benefits, but experience can also be a poor teacher. Learning from one’s own 
experience and the experience of others can lead to successful development, but these 
processes are also subject to some important limitations. When organizations are 
successfully coping with their environments, managers tend to interpret this as a 
rationale for existing organizational form, practice, and logic. In turn they may 
become less open to learning from new experience and knowledge and less prepared 
for adaptation when environments change. This presents an example of the kind of 
learning limitations that March and Levinthal  (1993, p. 106) call the success trap, i.e.   4
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organizations come to over-rely on their own past experience and do not adjust to 
new demands and challenges. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine why organizations may persist in adhering to 
past patterns of practice in the face of information that should have caused them to 
change. The learning literature interprets the findings of limited productive 
organizational learning as cognitive limitations due to “finite information processing 
capacity” experienced by the organizational actors in the face of ambiguity, 
uncertainty, and conflict (Levitt and March, 1988; March and Levinthal, 1993). 
However, there might be other explanations than cognitive constraints, and to make 
sense of some empirical observations we set forth a “political framework” for 
understanding the dynamics behind the outcome. From this point of view we propose 
that the success trap can be seen as a result of intra-organizational games of interests 
and power that evolve around an organization’s dominant action strategy and task 
system.  
 
Our approach is primarily inductive in so far as the paper generates rather than tests 
theory. However, since the goal is to elaborate on current conceptualization of a 
phenomenon, the paper begins with reviewing relevant literature. Then follows a 
presentation of some observations from an exploratory case study. This case 
describes an organizational adaptation process in two stages. In the first stage the 
management experienced a period of success, and then in the second stage they were 
confronted with a mismatch between the organization’s practices and environmental 
demands. In our original reporting we analyzed the case as two separate adaptation   5
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processes: one successful and one less successful (Askvik and Espedal, 1989). More 
recently we discovered that by bringing the two processes together we could interpret 
the case as an example of the success trap. On reviewing the case from this 
theoretical angle, we became aware that it has a potential for theory development. 
The considered processes contain organizational dynamics that provide evidence 
which can be attributed to political aspects of the success trap. These aspects will be 
elaborated in the last part of the paper. 
 
The success trap and mechanisms behind this limited organizational learning 
process 
The success trap is the consequence of mutual local positive feedback between 
experience and competence (March 1994, p.38). This version has also been named 
the competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). Having competence with an action 
strategy leads to success, which leads to more experience with the specific strategy, 
which leads to greater competence. Organizational actors become better and better at 
one action strategy while doing it more and more and being continually successful. 
This positive local feedback pushes the actors into a competency lock-in, where 
efficiency in using one action strategy makes trying alternative strategies unlikely. 
This in turn makes it unlikely that the actors will accumulate the experience 
necessary with other strategies to realize their potential. The competency trap implies 
that learning from experience favors exploitation behavior: search and practice 
become focused on well-known alternatives, underestimating the potential benefits of 
the unknown (March, 1994, p. 38).   6
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Another, somewhat different, version of the success trap puts more emphasis on how 
success affects the self-confidence of organizations and their members. A 
consequence of the successful exploitation of an action strategy is, according to 
Levinthal and March (1993, p. 104), that an organization’s self-confidence is boosted 
to an overrated extent. Learners settle into those areas in which they have 
competence, and if they generalize their experience to other areas, they are likely to 
exaggerate the likelihood of success. Organizations and individuals may become 
excessively confident that they have the skills to deal with problems they confront in 
so far as their previous experiences are successful. This may, however, not be the 
case if we are talking about significantly different domains of action, or when the 
relationship between previous success and future performance is uncertain (e.g. a 
nuclear disaster or major scientific discovery). But, as long as confidence is boosted, 
organizations will tend not to discover and learn from a number of unanticipated 
failures when these are insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, there may also be some kind of connections between success and people 
holding leadership positions in organizations. According to Levitt and March (1988) 
organizations will tend to promote successful people. On average, successful people 
have drawn experiences that have had more favourable results than they should 
expect to continue. Hence successful people will be over-represented in the 
managerial positions of organizations.  March (1994, p. 31) claims that places where 
successful people gather, including organizational leadership arenas, will be crowded   7
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with people who exaggerate their importance and underestimate the role of 
uncontrollable variation. 
 
From a more general perspective Sitkin (1992, p. 234) has identified the following 
liabilities of success. First, success generates complacency. It becomes difficult to get 
people to experiment with new ideas when the existing solutions are producing the 
desired results. Second, to experiment may even be risky under such circumstances 
since actors may come up with something less successful, and subsequently the actors 
might be blamed and punished for the problems they cause by not adhering to current 
procedures. Third, success tends to restrict the search for and attention to discrepant 
information that might disconfirm some of the presumably positive results. Priority 
will be given to information that supports the existing routines, unless some really 
alarming and disruptive events take place.  Fourth, success will foster homogeneity 
with respect to procedures, personnel and organizational subcultures. Successful 
organizations will tend to maintain their successful formulae through keeping their 
practices constant and avoiding divergent activities. The resulting homogeneity will 
further contribute to conservatism and anti-experimentalism attitudes among 
members of an organization. 
 
The  two faces of the success trap 
The above presentation indicates how success may limit organizational learning. 
Organizations that experience success seem to develop biases in the way the   8
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organizational actors come to consider action and evaluate outcomes of their actions. 
Our elaboration of the character of such biases takes as its point of departure on the 
one hand the concept of strategic paradigm as a potential cognitive barrier to 
learning. In addition we would like to introduce the idea of political biases as a set of 
alternative barriers to learning after a period of organisational success. 
 
Strategic paradigm refers to the observation that organizations develop collective 
interpretations of the world, providing them with images of themselves and their 
environments. Hedberg (1981, p. 8) calls them "world views." They are sets of rules 
that organizations use to interpret stimuli and scattered information into meaningful 
maps of themselves and their environments. "They influence what problems are 
perceived, how these problems are interpreted and what learning ultimately results.” 
(Hedberg, 1981, p. 8). In this perspective, organizational learning is primarily a 
collective enterprise. Organizations learn through their individual members, yet 
individuals may come and go while the collective interpretations of organizations 
basically remain the same. 
 
The strategic paradigm plays an important role in the organization’s cognitive 
structure and identity, and we assume that it is normally anchored in the top 
management. On the one hand the strategic paradigm is a product of the kind of 
information that the top management receives from internal and external sources. On 
the other hand characteristics of the paradigm will itself determine how information is   9
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collected and interpreted, i.e. it affects the actors perception of what is happening, 
why it happened and whether what happened was satisfactory. In this way the 
strategic paradigm constructs socially approved conceptions of legitimate 
organizational practices, and that again might give the actors a conception of control. 
 
The processes we consider in this paper provide evidence that can be attributed to 
limited cognitive capabilities as well as to political aspects of organizational learning. 
A political explanation is built around a political conception of organizational goals 
and power structures. Organizations have multiple actors with conflicting interests 
and identities not entirely resolved by organizational rules (Cyert and March, 1963, p. 
26-34). Organizational power relations determine how instances of conflict and 
interest competition are resolved. According  to this perspective the strategic 
paradigm is not only a way of perceiving and constructing the world. It has also 
political implications for organizational actors. The actors’ interests and influence 
will be affected by how strategic issues are addressed in organizations, and as a 
consequence intra-organizational games of interests and power might evolve around 
the strategic paradigm and the organization's task system (e.g. Mintzberg, 1983 and 
1985; Pfeffer, 1981 and 1992). Such games may be mediated by the frameworks 
organizations use in order to comprehend their environments. For instance, if a 
specific technology is defined as the core competence of a company, the expertise on 
this technology will benefit in status and resources (Crozier, 1964). If sales activities 
are identified as a critical component, the sales people might benefit in similar ways. 
Hence there are reasons to expect that individuals and groups will have vested   10
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interests in certain interpretative frameworks, and they will tend to favour a strategic 
diagnosis that promotes their particular interests.  
 
Competition among groups and individuals might give rise to "paradigm politics" 
where conflicting perspectives are propagated by opposing groups (Levitt and March, 
1988; Fiol, 1994). Such games spawn noise in the communication and information 
systems of organizations (Argyris, 1995, p. 196). Organizations develop defensive 
routines to prevent individuals and groups from experiencing embarrassment or 
threats, and yet, for the very same reasons defensive routines also create barriers to 
communication of valid information. 
 
A political perspective may enhance our understanding of the limited organizational 
learning process that is called the success trap. A success-based strategic paradigm 
becomes rigid and difficult to change, not only for cognitive reasons, but also because 
of the political implications it has. Organizational actors become attached to and 
identify themselves with a strategic paradigm, not only because they hold it to be 
true, but also because it serves their interests.  
 
In closing the theoretical discussion about strategic paradigm we will highlight the 
main difference between a cognitive and a political explanation of the success trap. 
According to the cognitive perspective the success trap will emerge as a consequence 
of the fact that organizational members are unaware of relevant and “available”   11
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information. The strategic paradigm causes blindness that prevents learning from 
one’s own experience and external knowledge, and from this point of view the 
success trap is an outcome of unintended organizational processes. According to the 
political perspective the success trap will emerge as a consequence of the fact that 
organizational actors are unwilling to exchange and use relevant and “available” 
information. Therefore, the actors’ unwillingness to communicate and discuss 
relevant issues related to a “successful’ strategic paradigm will prevent productive 
organizational learning, whatever cognitive capabilities these actors may have. And 
from this point of view, is the success trap an outcome of intended organizational 
processes. Thus Starbuck, Greve and Hedberg  (1978, p.118) observed that although 
denial of a crisis may arise from sincere conviction, managers also resist strategic 
reorientation because they want to retain power and status.  
 
Findings from the case we are presenting below are meant to illustrate the difference 
between the two explanations, and to provide a point of departure for a conceptual 
development of political aspects of the success trap.  
 
Presentation of the case 
Our data stem from a research project on management learning and adaptation. It was 
designed as a series of case studies of five organizations (Askvik and Espedal, 1989). 
The study was based on the idea that we can look at adaptation as an organizational 
learning process and, furthermore, that management groups represent an important   12
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organizational learning medium. The purpose was to map processes and conditions of 
management learning during and after change processes. 
 
The case studies followed a fixed pattern. In each organization the researchers 
selected, in collaboration with management, four change processes from the recent 
history of the organization. Each process was mapped through interviews with key 
actors in and around the management group, and through various types of archival 
data. The interviews and the relevant written material formed the basis for the 
description of each history. Each of the stories related to the same organization, and 
were then reported separately as single cases along with general analyses of the 
organizational learning style, barriers, and ways of handling information.  
 
In the five organizations, we studied 20 instances of change. In this paper we have 
chosen to depict one case that we perceive as particularly interesting as a closer 
investigation of how success may affect learning in a negative way. Others of the 
cases we studied illustrate other aspects of the learning process and will not be dealt 
with. As mentioned in the introduction, we originally identified the present case as 
two separate adaptation processes. However, later on we did realize that by 
combining the two processes we could reinterpret them as an example of the success 
trap. Hence, our objective is primarily theory development, and our research strategy 
is inductive in so far as our data were collected before we established the theoretical 
relevance of the case we analyze. In the presentation of findings we try to illustrate   13
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typical styles of thinking, through some citations from the interviews with the actors, 
and these are presented without further source statement. 
 
The case in question is from an engineering firm, which had specialized in a certain 
type of technology related to removal of fat and water from wet masses of biological 
material. Functions the firm performed in this process were related to design, 
development, and sale of technical process equipment. The actual production of 
technical process equipment was executed by other firms.   
 
From its origin as a producer of fish meal, the firm was able to develop a new and 
efficient technology for fish meal production, i.e., the firm created new products and 
processes by combining elements in existing technologies in ways that resulted in 
synergy.  The top management saw a new business in this technology, and the firm 
became a leading developer of production equipment for the fish-meal industry 
market world wide.  
 
Around 1950 we can observe a small business. The organization was informal and 
non-bureaucratic and coordination took place as mutual adjustments. There was 
considerable freedom to experiment and try out new technical solutions. The firm was 
highly market- and customer oriented. Improvements of the technology were inspired 
by their perceptions of customers’ needs, who in most cases were invited in to 
influence the design of the products.   14
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The employees identified with the firm and our informants portray them as an 
enthusiastic and well-integrated group. The top leader had been one of the founders 
of the firm and appeared as a typical entrepreneur who searched for and exploited 
new opportunities. He was a strong personality who held a wide perspective on the 
activities of the company, and he knew a lot of people, including customers and 
potential customers. He also had the ability to exploit the talent of his employees. 
 
In his entrepreneurial way of thinking the top leader gradually came to realize that the 
technology for fish-meal production might have some characteristics related to the 
removal of liquids from wet organic material in general. The idea led to a mental 
orientation towards examining new opportunities and to actively search for new areas 
of application for the technology. In this opportunity or solution-driven search, 
representatives of British beet-sugar industry somehow came into view, and the top 
leader saw similarities between the processes in the fish meal production and the 
processes in the sugar production from sugar beets.  
 
After the new market opportunity was discovered, the firm was able to enter a new 
market and could introduce a production technology that after some testing and 
modification proved to be a great advantage – compared to the old and traditional 
technology within that industry. The firm’s entrance to the new market became a   15
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success, and within a few years it gained a share of the world market for beet-sugar 
presses as high as 80 per cent.  
 
The expansion led to change in the firm’s formal organization. Deliveries to the beet-
sugar industry market became organized as a separate division, and the firm got two 
sales divisions and one department with responsibility for development and design of 
new or improved production equipment.  
 
The top leader was the driving force in the development of the new operation, and in 
doing so he formed a social system of close contacts between himself and his co-
workers and between the firm and the market. In this system there was a strong 
orientation toward gaining insight through continuous testing and experimentation, in 
cooperation with the customers. The mutual positive feedback between the actors' 
experience and competence led to greater competence, but also to a sense of 
mastering the situation: "We had knowledge about how to succeed in this market.” 
 
The firm's experience in the new market led to a confirmation of the idea of a 
generalized application of the initial fish meal production technology: “We employed 
existing means of production more appropriate, more advantageous – not differently 
but in a new way in a new context”.  Based on this general understanding the firm 
later introduced their core technology to other industries where the efficient removal 
of liquid from wet masses was a technological challenge, e.g. offal from the   16
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slaughtering industry, and from breweries and distilleries: "We exploit the value of 
our knowledge by providing innovative solutions to industries that were unaware of 
the potential of that knowledge.” 
 
The firm’s success within the beet-sugar industry market lasted for several years. 
Then some foreign competitors entered the market. In the beginning they simply 
copied the firm’s technology and thus avoided the development costs. However, in 
this initial period of competition the firm was able to master the situation, but after 
some time the situation changed. One particular foreign competitor developed pieces 
of technology which, in the judgment of important customers, were the best and least 
expensive available. This was a new and uncustomary situation: Our firm was no 
longer the actor which invariably brought the best and newest technology forward. 
 
The new situation was the beginning of a period where the engineering firm gradually 
lost its market shares within the beet-sugar business. Its financial success decreased, 
and its brilliant image started to fade. For a number of years the firm managed to 
survive in this market by selling technical process equipment which in fact lagged 
behind the latest developments and which also was more expensive than what the 
competitor could offer. It took eight years before the engineering firm was able to 
meet the challenges effectively and stop the trend of diminishing market share, at that 
time reduced to 25 per cent.  
   17
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Seen from the outside, there were no obvious reasons why the firm should not have 
been able to meet and manage the new challenges. There were well-documented data 
about the technical capabilities of the competitor's products as well as sales figures, 
and both were alarming. There were no recognizable obstacles, in a technical sense, 
for going ahead and doing development work which would change the situation. The 
competitor made use of and had improved a well-known technology that the firm 
originally had developed. There were also organizational opportunities to do 
something - in the firm’s frequent and regular meetings targeted to handle 
development and design issues. But nothing really productive happened before the 
firm became reorganized and got a new top leader. 
 
In the same time period, as the firm went from success to failure in the beet-sugar 
industry market, the firm held its position in the fish-meal industry market and it 
expanded significantly to new markets. This occurred through development, design 
and sale of production equipment, based on the same core technology that was used 
respectively in the fish-meal and in the beet-sugar industry markets. The expansion to 
new markets was very important for the top management’s strategic paradigm, 
reputation and relationship to the firm’s owners. During the whole period the top 
management had strong support from external stakeholders, and the expansion 
indirectly offset the firm’s failure within the beet-sugar industry market. 
   18
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The story emerging from the data depicts a development from success to failure. The 
top management did not take seriously the challenges the firm was confronting within 
the beet-sugar industry market and they persisted in adhering to past patterns of 
practice in the face of information that should have caused change. However, this 
finding contains pieces of evidence that point to different processes – cognitive as 
well as political processes. Evidence for a cognitive explanation will be addressed 
first.  
   
    Evidence that can be attributed to a cognitive explanation of the success trap 
The story portrays a firm that in an early stage of its history developed a conception 
of how it could expand to new business areas through exploiting the same core 
technology. The actors’ understanding of what kind of situation the firm faced, and 
what it could do in the situation, formed the top management's strategic paradigm: 
“We developed a new technology for fish meal production, but we did not look at the 
technology as specially related to this type of production. We believed it was a 
general technology for removal of fat and water from wet masses of biological 
material, which could be used in several industries… Our vision proved to be right. 
Exploiting the technology led to success, and we experienced that success fostered 
success.” One element in this paradigm was a notion about the firm as a knowledge 
broker. In the beginning the firm innovated by combining existing technologies in 
new ways that resulted in synergy, and later on the firm innovated by transferring 
knowledge from where it was known to where it was not known.  Another element 
was a notion about the firm’s technical capability.  The firm was not only a   19
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knowledge broker, but had also developed a distinctive competence in exploiting this 
knowledge commercially. 
 
The strategic paradigm and long lasting success created an organizational identity, i.e. 
the management shared connected beliefs that became a theory of “who we are”: “We 
are a ‘knowledge firm’ and our success factor is our capability to expand to new 
markets by exploiting the same core technology.” The top management considered 
the firm as the best in the business, and it was seen as unlikely that another firm could 
be as good as reports indicated it to be. Hence there would be a tendency to 
underestimate and not take seriously factual information about technical competition 
and shrinking market shares in the beet-sugar business. Despite the general tendency 
to underestimate relevant and available critical information, the sales division for the 
beet-sugar business gradually realized the problems they were facing. However, the 
head of this division was not able to convey the knowledge to the top leader and the 
chief of the development department: “Nobody in the top management could really 
believe what they were told”. There would also be a tendency to perceive the 
problems mainly as a result of failing sales efforts: “In the face of the miserable 
economic result within the beet-sugar business, the chief of the development 
department denied that a competitor had developed better sugar presses. He pointed 
to the possibility that the sales people were not as aggressive nor competent as called 
for.” That is to say: The technological imperfections, which actually turned out to be 
the chief reason for the firm's lagging behind its competitor, were not acknowledged, 
while inefficient sales efforts were emphasized as the important reason. We can also   20
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speculate that some of the development people, including the chief of the 
development department, had a closer attachment to the technology in use and its past 
achievements than people from sales divisions. To the extent that this was the case 
they would more easily claim that the sales efforts rather than the technological 
products were not up to standards. We do in fact not know from our data whether 
such forces were at work, but what we were told by our informants was that there was 
some active resistance to recognize the viewpoints conveyed by the sales division. 
 
The case illustrates a process where the management developed an image of the firm 
and its environments strongly affected by success. And as success was translated into 
knowledge and knowledge into success, not only did capabilities increase but self-
confidence did as well. The top management became more and more confident that 
the firm had the knowledge and skills to deal with the challenges within their 
domains. We do not have the full details of what this picture did look like, but at a 
certain point in time the changing business reality with competitive pressures were 
not seen as a problem and neither were the technological quality of the presses sold to 
the beet- sugar industry market. As a consequence, the old bold, experimental, market 
philosophy within the beet- sugar business faded, and this development was 
reinforced by the fact that customers were no longer invited to take an active part in 
product development. There was now a tendency for the firm to become dependent on 
the more conservative customers. These were not particularly interested in product 
development, and hence qualitative development and change were no longer 
encouraged from outside.    21
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The description of the limited productive organizational learning process provides 
evidence for the general proposition that the success trap was an outcome of 
cognitive constraints. The firm’s investing in a specific technology became over time 
an institutionalized practice. This practice became an embedded strategic paradigm 
and social pattern that were enacted, reproduced and entrenched through the day-to-
day activities of the management in the firm’s emerging growth. The actors’ thinking 
and practices led to unawareness of “available” critical information, or to 
unawareness of their inability to detect and correct a problem, and in this way the 
success trap became a threat to cognitive capability for learning. However, in order to 
make sense of some empirical observations we have to introduce an addition 
explanation.  
 
Evidence that can be attributed to a political explanation of the success trap 
From one perspective changing interdepartmental power relations can explain the 
firm's lack of response to the difficulties. As the firm evolved over time, 
organizational size and complexity increased. Since its early entrepreneurial period 
the firm had grown considerably regarding employees and products. The firm had 
also undergone changes in formalization and in specialization, and the organization 
had become more production oriented. Within most of the established areas, 
successful actions had lead to programs and formal routines for information handling 
and decision-making, and also to formal role specialization.    22
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As a consequence of the growth, the firm’s capacity and capability for design and 
development became a scarce resource. That led to competition and rivalry between 
the sales divisions , and the development department faced increased and conflicting 
demands. In this situation the departments’ management had to make priorities, and 
these priorities were a function of the top leader’s focus and attention. Projects that 
managed to get the top leader’s focus and attention got resources to design and 
product development, and projects that did not get attention lost in this competition.    
   
From another perspective also the changing power and interests of the top leader 
seems central to understand  why the company did not respond to the market signals. 
When the company expanded its activities into new and various markets, the top 
leader became more distant from the activities related to the beet-sugar industry 
business. The top leader considered that business was a goinging concern, and he 
preferred to put most of his effort and attention into challenges related to 
entrepreneurship and development within new business areas:  “He used to be the 
driving force… now we had a feeling that he downgraded our business (the beet-
sugar business) and distanced himself from it.” The formal responsibility for product 
development within established areas was delegated to those who dealt with 
customers. Compared to the early days, the top leader had to divide his time and 
attention between a number of persons and problem, and he did not pay much 
attention to problems that were not related to entrepreneurship and growth.    23
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As a consequence of the formalization and specialization, the design and 
development department gradually had less contact with the firms’ customers. The 
result was less experiment and risk orientation, and the actors within this department 
indicated less willingness to trace new opportunities. In other words, the old 
experiment and risk orientation had been replaced by a more conservative approach 
to product development. This attitude and approach had negative influence on the 
collaboration with the sales divisions.  
 
The central actors in any major decision about the firm's product development were 
the top leader, the chief of the development department, and the head of the business 
area in question. This functioned well for some areas, but led to problems within the 
well-established beet-sugar business. Within that business the three central actors had 
been in the firm from the beginning. Earlier on they had been quite close to each 
other, but at this time they were unable to sort out their differences. Over time the 
social relationships had become distant, they did not communicate well any longer, 
and their ways of cooperating were not very productive to meet the challenges from 
competitive pressures.  
 
The firm’s growth and development changed the relationships, roles and rules within 
the top management, but the actors did not open-mindly and critically examine the 
consequences of the change: “We did not deal with interpersonal and   24
24
interdepartmental conflicts in a productive way.” The problem was reinforced by the 
lack of a common forum where integration could take place, and where differences 
could be sorted out:  “In a situation with ambiguity and unresolved conflicts we 
lacked a common forum for the management, where conflicts could be sorted out, and 
where strategic implications of critical information at hand could be dealt with.” 
 
The analysis shows conflicts within the firm between different groups, and these 
conflicts indicate various commitments to the dominant strategic paradigm. One 
group, the sales division for the beet-sugar business and its managers, experienced 
that the firm's conception of its technological superiority vis-a-vis the competitors 
was outdated. Hence they wanted to improve and develop the firm's products within 
their own business area. However, another group, the top leader and the head of the 
development department did not share this assessment. They claimed that basically, 
the old paradigm was still valid, and the consequence of their view was lack of 
resources for new product development.  
 
One reason for the top managers’ commitment to the old paradigm was that in fact 
they did not want to realize that the situation had changed. They were busy in other 
areas, and they did not want to get involved. If they concurred with the actors from 
the beet-sugar business, they would have to change their priorities. In particular the 
development department would have to allocate resources to innovation and product 
development in the beet-sugar business, during a period in which they were rather   25
25
busy in adapting the firm's distinctive technology and competence to other industries. 
Time, attention and capability for innovation and development were scarce resources, 
and there was a strong competition for these resources. 
 
Managers from the new business areas were a third group. These actors were not 
directly involved with the issues within the beet-sugar business, but through their 
actions they indirectly reinforced the problem. Managers from the new businesses 
report that they could see what happened within the beet-sugar industry market: “I 
could see what happened and I had another understanding of the situation than the 
top managers… I think the top managers’ emotional attachment to our dominant 
strategy created blindness for critical information… However, I preferred to be an 
audience.” Managers were audiences to the development because they had their own 
interests in not calling attention to the top management thinking and behavior: “As 
the head of my division I had interest in not calling attention to the top leader’s 
priorities.” These actors feared that an open examination of firm’s strategic paradigm 
could cause disadvantage for themselves. They could lose the top leader’s focus and 
attention, and in this way lose resources to innovation and product development 
within theirs own business areas. Therefore the actors did not engage the top 
managers in a dialogue about the attributions they were making about them, and they 
did not communicated their understanding to the head of the beet-sugar business: “We 
engaged in a kind of parallel plays without coordination.”    
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The case illustrates that the firm’s top managers remained individually and 
collectively unaware of the mismatch between the firm’s strategic paradigm that 
guided their action, and a changing pattern of external reality. The top managers 
persisted in a previously established pattern of thought and action, in so persisting, 
failed to act on what some of the firm’s central members knew. We have pointed out 
that this finding could be given a cognitive explanation. However, a cognitive 
interpretation does not explain why central members of the firm did not want to or 
were unwilling to communicate and discuss their privately held knowledge.  
 
The described success trap can be seen as an outcome of how actors try to make sense 
of ongoing events and process and how they try to use this knowledge, but it can also 
be seen as an outcome of the actors’ interaction. In the first time period the actors 
operated as a team, i.e. they had nearly consistent identity and preferences. In the 
second period the actors operated as a coalition, and multiple interests and 
incoherence in relationships between groups of managers blocked an open, fact-based 
dialogue over critical issues related to business and internal priorities. The top 
managers’ strong commitment to a strategic paradigm led to resource priorities that 
were beneficial for actors within new business areas, but this was not beneficial for 
the actors within the established beet-sugar business. The first group feared 
consequences of change in priorities, and they had strong interests in keeping the 
threatening priority issue undiscussable.  And in doing so they reinforced the top 
management’s unawareness of critical information that could have changed the firm’s 
strategic paradigm. The top management became unaware of an existing incoherence   27
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in policies enacted by different groups of managers and how that incoherence was 
connected to the strategic paradigm. The mechanism which prevented the 
organization from acting on what some of its members knew, was therefore not 
cognitive limitations but conflicting interests.  
Conclusion 
The learning literature proposes a cognitive interpretation of the success trap: Limited 
productive learning is an outcome of the fact that organizations have cognitive 
limitations due to “finite information processing capacity” experienced by the 
organizational actors in the face of ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict. In this paper 
we have elaborated and modified these ideas about the success trap to make sense of 
some empirical observations. We have presented another way of looking at the 
phenomenon observed, and argue that limited organizational learning might be an 
outcome of processes in which the learning actors have conflicting interests and 
identities. Power relations impact how conflicts are resolved and how much influence 
each actor has in terms of identifying and dealing with critical problems. During 
periods of success established power structures tend to be strengthened, and 
especially executives may benefit from associating themselves with successful 
policies (Miller 1994, p.326).  
 
Productive organizational learning occurs in a context where organizational actors are 
linked through the exchange and open sharing of valid information, and where they 
have confidence and come to trust one another. In such an idealistic setting the   28
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actors’ learning might approve or disapprove organizational routines, and that might 
lead to modification or change of practice which is no longer efficient. This process 
appears quite straightforward, but is not. There are difficulties, and in this case most 
of the difficulties begun with the complications of transferring information from one 
group of actors to another group. And this problem was related to the difficulty of 
learning across organizational boundaries and levels. Productive organizational 
learning occurs through networks of collaborative ties among organizational actors, 
but power and conflicting interests prevented development of networks as open 
communication systems. The preferences embraced by some learners were 
inconsistent with the preferences of other learners, and these inconsistencies led to 
difficulties in exchanging information and cooperating among the actors, as 
individuals acted intelligent from their own points of view. The study thereby 
supports and expands Tsoukas’s (1996) arguments on the firm as a distributed 
knowledge system, and the difficulties in managing learning under these 
circumstances. Another problem was the challenge of building long-term reciprocal 
social relationships that foster development of trust. Voluntary transfer of knowledge 
is an act of faith and trust, but this condition was hardly present in the context of 
unresolved conflicts, fear and different commitment to the organization’s strategic 
paradigm. 
 
The case depicts a success trap-situation where organizational actors were not only 
unaware of but also unwilling to use relevant and “available” information. This 
unwillingness, which prevented productive organizational learning, can be attributed   29
29
to a political explanation of the success tap. The political perspective captures 
intended processes behind the success trap; however, it is not an alternative but an 
additional perspective to a cognitive explanation. The political framework has only to 
a limited extent been addressed in the learning literature, and it probably deserves 
more attention in future research. 
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